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ABSTRACT 
We evaluate potential determinants of enrollment in an early 
retirement incentive program for non-tenure-track employees at a 
large university.  Using administrative records on the eligible, 
population of employees not covered by collective bargaining 
agreements, historical employee count and layoff data by budget 
units, and public information on unit budgets, we find dips in 
per-employee finances in a budget unit during the application 
year and higher recent per employee layoffs were associated with 
increased probabilities of eligible employee program enrollment. 
Our results also suggest that, on average, employees whose 
salaries are lower than we would predict given their personal 
characteristics and job titles were more likely to enroll in the 
early retirement program. To the extent that employees’ 
compensation reflect their productivity, as it should under a pay 
system in which annual salary increases are based on merit, this 
finding suggests that adverse selection was not a problem with 
the program.  That is, we find no evidence that on average the 
“most productive” employees took the incentive. 
A Introduction 
 
Cornell University, like many other academic institutions in the United States, 
was severely affected by the economic downturn and the financial meltdown that took 
place in 2008. In May 2008, the university had projected a balanced operating budget 
over the next few years. By the fall of 2008 the university realized that these projections 
were way off. A combination of declining endowments, declining gifts for current 
operations, declining support from New York State (for four of its colleges that received 
some support from the state), increased needs for borrowing to finance ongoing capital 
projects (because of the failure of projected gift flows for capital construction to 
materialize) and increasing financial need of its undergraduate students because of 
declining family incomes, left the university with substantial operating budget deficits. 
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The administration quickly understood that corrective actions had to be taken and that the 
university needed to rethink its cost structure. While layoffs would likely be necessary, 
because of its role as a major employer in the community in which it was located and its 
commitment to its employees, Cornell hoped to minimize the number of layoffs that 
occurred and the administration hit upon the idea of funding a one-time early retirement 
incentive program for staff to encourage a voluntary reduction in its level of employment. 
Our paper uses administrative data from Cornell to try to develop an 
understanding of the factors that led Cornell employees to elect to participate in the 
program. Our focus is on answering two questions: First, in a decentralized large 
university setting where budget units face different financial situations, did differences in 
variables related to the financial situations of the units, namely reductions in operating 
budgets and recent layoff experiences, influence the probability that eligible non-union1 
employees chose to participate in the program? Second, did the program lead to adverse 
selection, in the sense that people who chose to accept the early retirement offer were 
those who tended to be of “above average productivity”?  If the most productive staff 
were the ones who tended to accept the early retirement offer, the cost to the university in 
terms of lost productivity of the departing employees may offset the benefits of the 
program. 
To preview our major findings, we find that employees’ probabilities of accepting 
the early retirement offer were related to the budgetary pressures which they believed that 
their units faced. Moreover, while we cannot directly observe employee productivity, we 
                                                 
1
 Non-union refers to Cornell employees whose positions are not covered under a collective bargaining 
agreement.  We restrict our analyses to the non-union population which represents 84% of those eligible 
for the retirement incentive.  This restriction is imposed because pay increases under Cornell’s collective 
bargaining contracts do not have merit pay components so relative pay comparisons among union 
workers will not yield meaningful comparisons of productivity differences.  
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can observe if employees were paid below or above average, given their personal 
characteristics, years of experience at Cornell, and job titles.  We find a low value for this 
relative pay variable is a characteristic of the average employee Cornell chose to layoff in 
recent years.  Furthermore, we find that employees who accepted the early retirement 
offer, on average, were paid less than we might expect given the above named variables. 
To the extent that the university’s annual merit increase system was working the way it 
should and relative salaries at the university reflect relative productivities, this suggests 
that adverse selection did not prove to be a problem.  That is, there is no evidence that the 
“above average ability” employees were most likely to take the early retirement package. 
B Data and methods 
B.1 Program details 
 
To evaluate the impact of job-related risk factors that may influence non-tenure-
track staff’s decisions to accept an early retirement program window offer, we use 
administrative data on all eligible non-union employees (n=1083) for the Staff 
Retirement Incentive (SRI) program at Cornell University.  The SRI was announced to 
the University community on February 27, 2009 and was made available to all non-
tenure-track staff aged 55 or older, with at least 10 years of eligible service at the 
university as of June 30, 2009, who received less than 25% of their salaries from 
sponsored research funds.2  The SRI only required severance from a benefits eligible 
position at the university; employees “retiring” under the program were eligible to return 
                                                 
2
 Specific exclusions were made for senior administrators reporting to the president of the university; 
County-Based Cornell Cooperative Extension Association employees who were paid by the local County 
Cooperative Extension Associations and not by Cornell; employees at Cornell’s Puerto Rico observatory; 
employees on long-term disability; employees on university leave (who are not guaranteed reemployment 
rights; and individuals who had submitted voluntary resignation letters prior to March 1st. 
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to temporary non-benefits eligible positions and, after three years, to regular university 
employment. 
  The plan’s incentives included a taxable lump sum payment equal to one year of 
base pay and a nontaxable contribution to a defined contribution retirement fund of 30% 
of base pay. Enrollment in the SRI was only available for a fixed amount of time; 
employees were required to announce their intent to enroll in the program between March 
1st and March 30th of 2009.  Within this interval of time, there were no additional 
constraints that would make early or later enrollment desirable.3  After enrolling, 
severance with the university from a benefits eligible position was required by June 30, 
2009.  Staff enrolled in the program received the same benefits provided to all staff 
retirees, including retiree health insurance coverage. 
The SRI was not the only retirement option offered to staff at the time.  A Phased 
Retirement Incentive (PRI), which previously had existed only for tenure-track faculty, 
was concurrently offered that permitted employees to reduce their working hours to 20 
per week for up to three years following enrollment. Under this program, salaries would 
be proportionately reduced, but benefits (such as retirement system contributions) would 
continue to be based on the employees’ full-time salary.  Employees could not enroll in 
both programs and the PRI required supervisor approval, while the SRI did not.  These 
differences could have caused some individuals that would otherwise have accepted the 
SRI in isolation to accept the PRI when offered together so our results should be seen as 
                                                 
3 The university had announced that if the number of submitted applicants exceeded the funds available to 
finance the program that it would base enrollment in the program on applicants’ seniority at the university, 
not the date of their applications. Ultimately it decided to accept all of the eligible applications.   Any 
submitted application could be withdrawn before the window offer expired.  Any individual that received 
layoff notice while the window was available could still enroll in the program.  
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conditional on PRI availability. In practice, only two individuals enrolled in the PRI as of 
June 30, 2009. 
B.2 Data and descriptive statistics 
 
Our analyses make use of data from three sources.  Our primary data source 
consists of administrative records on the universe of non-union individuals eligible for 
the SRI.  These data are typical of what would be available to administrators trying to 
understand take-up rates for similar incentive programs.  Other than salary data, for 
which we have ten years for each employee, and the SRI enrollment outcome; all other 
variables are as of the date the plan became available, March 1st, 2009.  In this primary 
data source we have information on such items as retirement plan in which the individual 
is enrolled (defined benefit or defined contribution), demographic variables (such as age, 
gender, race/ethnicity, marital status and number of dependents currently covered by 
Cornell’s health insurance programs), employment unit (consisting of the 10 colleges and 
three administrative units), position typical weekly hours of work, job families, pay bands, 
years employed at Cornell, and years since the last job change within the university.  Job 
families are groupings of job positions by task area (such as Human Resources) or type of 
position (such as technical or administrative).  This variable is tied to job codes and job 
titles, and has relevance for compensation.  Pay bands are defined pay ranges (minimum 
and maximum) for positions meant to encourage equitable pay across employees with 
similar expertise or duties.  They are set at the university level and restrict management’s 
discretion in setting pay.  Higher pay bands typically reflect higher minimum, maximum, 
and medians for a pay range.  Pay bands in our sample fall into two main classifications: 
“banded” which consist of nine bands set by the university for staff positions, and 
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“unclassified/academic/executive/” ones in which more flexibility is given management 
in setting pay than it had in the “banded” structure. 
Our second source of information is on historical employee counts and layoffs.  
Employee counts are by year as of the end of the fiscal year, June 30th, and are at the 
employment unit (college or administrative unit) level.  When per employee variables are 
computed, the denominator is the prior end-of-fiscal year employee count.  Our layoff 
data are at the individual level; for much or our analyses they are aggregated up to 
employment unit fiscal year numbers.  When we construct Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 layoff 
variables we only use layoff numbers through March 2009 and then multiply them by 
1.333 to get a projected annual FY number.  We do this because layoffs in April, May, 
and June of 2009 were not observed by SRI applicants before they had to make their 
decisions by March 31, 2009 to enroll in the program and so we implicitly assume the 
employee projects that the rate of layoff for the last three months of the fiscal year would 
be the same as in the previous nine months.    
Our third set of data comes from budget reports available to the public on 
Cornell’s website.  FY budget reports, which include projections of the next FY’s 
resources and spending, are typically released in May of each year. So, for example, in 
May 2009, the FY 2010 (July 1, 2009 to June 30, 2010) report was released. This report 
contained projected unit resources and expenditures for FY 2010. However, it was not 
released in time for employees considering whether to accept the SRI offer to use this 
information. While we could have assumed that employees had rational expectations, we 
instead assumed that they based their projections on likely unit budget chances in FY 
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2010 on the budget changes that their units had experiences during FYs 2006 through 
2009.4  
In what follows we exclude three individuals who held multiple jobs, three 
individuals for whom retirement plan data were missing or who were enrolled in a hybrid 
defined benefit/contribution retirement plan, and four individuals for whom 2006 salary 
data were missing, or a total of ten individuals.5   Our analysis thus uses a sample of 1073 
individuals.  Approximately one-third of the non-union SRI eligible individuals chose to 
accept the retirement incentive. 
Unfortunately, several potentially important variables are absent from our data. 
We do not observe dependents, spouses, or partners in our administrative databases, but 
rather whether dependents, spouses or partners are covered by the employee’s health plan.  
We also do not observe spousal/partner or employee retirement wealth or health status.6  
The first column of panel A of Table 1 presents mean values for many of the 
control variables used in this analysis.  Relative small percentages, about 16% of the 
eligible non-union employees are covered by a defined benefit pension plan.  Most 
eligible non-union employees were working full time (as defined as more than 38 hours 
per week), were white, and were neither lecturers nor researchers.  Eligible non-union 
employees have an average of 24 years, which is well above the required 10 years for 
                                                 
4
 In results not shown in this paper we estimated models using FY 2010 budget information to test an 
assumption of rational expectations.  The FY 2010 budget information was not available to the employees 
prior to accepting the SRI.  These models were inconsistent across specification and seldom had precise 
coefficients.  
5
 One possibility for missing salary is that the individual was temporarily away from the university that 
year (for example a spouse of a faculty member accompanying the faculty member when he or she was 
on sabbatical). Eligibility for the SRI required 10 years of service, not 10 consecutive years of service. 
6
 Using the Health and Retirement Survey, Bound, et. al. (1999); Brown (2000) and Dwyer and Hu (2000) 
showed that higher employee health is negatively correlated with the decision to retire while spousal 
health has a positive association with retirement probabilities.   Stock & Wise (1990) and Samwick (1998) 
show that the present discounted value of future wealth from retiring at a given date is an important 
factor in retirement decisions. 
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SRI eligibility, and their years of service varies widely across individuals and has a 
standard deviation of 8 years.  The average age of SRI eligible non-union employees was 
60 and 63% were women.    
The first column of panel B shows the fraction of non-union SRI eligible 
individuals employed in different employment units at the Ithaca campus of the 
university. These units are the ten different colleges at Cornell and three composite other 
units that we have created; student services, academic programs, and administration and 
support.7  The units have considerable autonomy in making staffing decisions and in 
deciding how to allocate resources.  Furthermore, because funding of the different units 
comes from a variety of different sources, for example some of the colleges receive some 
appropriations from New York State and the endowment level per student varies across 
colleges, the units face different budgetary pressures.  To emphasize this point, Figure 1 
displays both budgeted resources and salary expenditures per employee in $10,000’s, 
averaged from 2005 to 2008, by unit, with the vertical lines representing two standard 
error bands around the mean. This figure indicates that there was substantial variation in 
per employee resources and budgeted salary expenditures between units, with movements 
between salary and resource levels being very similar across units.  The extent of 
variability in within unit budget amounts for the years 2005 to 2008 differs among the 
units with the most variability displayed by the Academic Programs (AP) unit for both 
per employee resources and salary, and the least variability shown by School of Hotel 
Administration (HOTEL) for resources and by Student Services (SS) for salary.  
                                                 
7
 Employment unit codes are as follows: SS “Student Services”, AP “Academic Programs”, AS 
“Administration and Support”, CALS “College of Agriculture and Life Sciences”, AAP “Architecture, Art & 
Planning”, ART “Arts and Sciences”, ENG “Engineering”, HOTEL “Hotel Administration”, CHE “College of 
Human Ecology”, ILR “Industrial and Labor Relations”, JS “Johnson School”, LAW “Law School”, VET 
“College of Veterinary Medicine”.  
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The variability in resources over time across units comes from the variety of 
revenue sources the units receive and the variability in each source over time. The units 
differ in the shares of their revenues coming from tuition, gifts, endowment income, 
sponsored programs, state and federal appropriations and allocations from the central 
administration.  In our empirical work we focus on unit level per employee budgeted 
resources and salary expenditures as the measures that eligible employees may focus on 
in thinking about the financial pressures that their units face. 
The remaining columns of Table 1 display comparisons of means for those non-
union eligible employees that enrolled in the SRI and those that declined the retirement 
incentive offer.  Some non-union eligible employees were probably inclined to retire 
within the interval of time that the SRI required accepted applicants to retire (March 1, 
2000 – June 30, 2009) independent of the SRI.  Their retirement decisions could be 
motivated by variables such as age, years of service, health, and family considerations, so 
it is important to control for these variables in our statistical analyses.  The comparison of 
means for those that accepted and declined the retirement incentive sheds light on some 
of the variables that may prove to be important in our multivariate analyses. 
Retirement age incentives appear in government policies and in employee benefit 
structures.  The Internal Revenue Service specifies ages for minimum distributions and 
penalty free withdrawal of retirement funds, while the Social Security Administration 
specifies ages for receipt of full or partial Social Security benefits. Defined benefit 
pension plan structures also play a role by setting how annual pension benefits levels 
depend upon years of service, age at retirement, and a measure of average “final” salary.  
For these reasons we might expect the relationship between SRI enrollment, age, and 
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years of service to be increasing but non-linear.  Indeed, Table 1 shows that individuals 
that enrolled in the SRI are on average 2.24 years older and worked 2.32 more years at 
Cornell, than individuals who turned down the opportunity to accept the retirement 
incentive offer.  Further analyses reported below describe the non-linear relationship. 
 Having a dependent child on an employee’s health plan is associated with not 
accepting the retirement incentive.  This may reflect the age of the employee or that the 
employee has greater financial responsibilities that reduces the attractiveness of the 
incentive.  Finally, on average, employees who accepted the incentive offer had lower 
levels of salaries and recent salary growth than employees who did not enroll in the 
program.   
Differences in all of the factors mentioned above across employment units at the 
university may be responsible for the differences in enrollment rates across employment 
units observed in Panel B of Table 1. For example, while 3.85% of non-union eligible 
employees were from the School of Industrial and Labor Relations (ILR), 6.35.6% of the 
employees who accepted the incentive offer came from this unit. In contrast, while 1.95% 
of the eligible non-union eligible employees came from Cornell’s Law School (LAW), 
only 1.10% of the employees who accepted the incentive came from this unit.  As such, 
we turn to a multivariate analysis to see if differences in acceptance rates across units still 
exist after we control for the characteristics of the eligible non-union eligible employees 
in each unit that are available to us in our data. 
Appendix Table 1 presents estimates of a linear probability model of SRI 
enrollment (Yes = 1, No =0) as a function of all of the non-union eligible employee 
characteristics listed in panel A of Table 1 as well as dichotomous variables for the units 
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(panel B) in which the employee was employed.8 In this model, the continuous age and 
years of service variables have been converted to binary indicator variables to allow the 
effects of age and years of service on the acceptance decision to be nonlinear.  The 
omitted (reference) group in the model is individuals who are white male employees ages 
55-56 with 10 to 15 years of service, who are employed in the administration and support 
unit (AS).  These estimates suggest that in the multivariate context there are no 
statistically significant differences in the acceptance probabilities associated with 
employees’ full-time/part-time status, academic/nonacademic staff status, race/ethnicity, 
retirement plan type, or presence of spouse or dependents on the employee’s health 
insurance.   
We graphically display in Figure 2 the coefficients (with two standard error bands) 
that show the impact of the age, years of service, and employment unit dichotomous 
variables from Appendix Table 1 on the decision to accept the retirement incentive offer. 
The acceptance probability increases monotonically with age at a decreasing rate until 
roughly ages 63 and over when it flattens out. The acceptance probability also increases 
with years of service, with the steepness of the relationship increasing after 30 years of 
service. The point estimates suggest that an individual with 36 years of service or more 
has about a 15 percentage point higher probability of accepting the offer than an 
individual with 10-15 years of service, all other factors held constant. Presumably many 
individuals with such long years of service would be contemplating retirement even in 
the absence of the program. 
                                                 
8
 For comparison purposes a logit model is also presented in this table; the signs and significance of the 
coefficients are very similar in the two models. 
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It is apparent in the bottom panel of the figure that much variation still exists in 
enrollment probabilities across employment units even after we control for individual’s 
personal characteristics including age and years of service.  Relative to the omitted group 
(Administration and Support), employees employed in the Academic Programs unit (AP) 
and the College of Arts and Sciences (ART) are less likely to enroll in the SRI, while 
individuals from the School of Industrial and Labor Relations (ILR) are more likely to 
enroll in the SRI.9   
In what follows we try to better understand this heterogeneity of enrollment rates 
among the employment units that persists even when conditioning on factors such as age, 
years of service, defined benefit, union status, and family characteristics. Specifically our 
focus is on individual’s perceptions of their risk of being laid off and on whether they are 
paid less, or more, than average given their personal and job characteristics. 
B.3 Econometric framework 
 
We estimate models of the form y = Fα + 	
 + γp +  βz +  ϵ where F is a 
linear model or a logistic transformation,  indexes the individual and  indexes the 
employment unit.  The outcome, , is 1 if individual  in employment unit  enrolled in 
the SRI and is 0 otherwise.  Individual level controls are included in the vector 	, while 
p is a proxy for a measure of the employee’s productivity, and z is an employment unit 
                                                 
9
 The differences in the precision of the estimated coefficients of the employment unit variables are 
driven largely by differences in sample sizes. Some of the precisely estimated coefficients (for example 
those for academic programs (AP) and the College of Agriculture and Life Sciences (CALS)) have over 150 
individuals in the eligible population, while some of the imprecisely estimated coefficients (for example 
those for the College of Architecture, Art and Planning (AAP) and the Hotel School (HOTEL)) have less than 
15 individuals in the eligible population. 
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level factor that we hypothesize is associated with SRI enrollment. The vector 	 contains 
many of the variables found in panel A of Table 1. 
In the absence of an observable measure of actual productivity, it is common in 
the literature to obtain a proxy for productivity by making some comparison of salaries 
across individuals.10  If we can identify individuals who are performing roughly the same 
work and if we believe that the university’s merit pay policies lead individuals’ salaries to 
be roughly proportionate to their productivity, then we can use a measure of an 
individual’s “relative” salary as a measure of his or her relative productivity.  With our 
rich administrative data that provides us with information on pay bands, time in most 
recent position, and functional job categories, we are able to narrowly define groups of 
potentially substitutable workers and develop relative salary measures. 
To construct our relative salary measure, , we first estimate the following 
equation, 
s =   Bandδ +   Fam"γ" + 	#

$%
"&'
$(
&'
) + η 
where + is the log of 2009 fiscal year salary for individual .  Included on the right hand 
side are job band dichotomous variables( ,-./0, equal to 1 if individual  is in job band 
1 and is 0 otherwise), as well as job family dummies, (2-34 equal to 1 if individual  is 
in job family 3 and is 0 otherwise).  The vector 56 is comprised of indicator variables for 
whether the employee is fulltime and non-academic staff, a continuous variable for years 
                                                 
10
 See, e.g., Pencavel, (2001); Ashenfelter & Card (2002); Allen, Clark, & Ghent (2004); Kim (2003). 
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since job entry date, employment unit dummies, and years of service dummies at the 
same level of aggregation as described in Section B.2.11  
Our relative salary measure is given by the portion of salary unexplained by this 
linear equation (the residual); this is normalized by its standard deviation for ease of 
interpretation.  Formally, our proxy for relative salary is estimated as  = 78
∗
:;∗
 where  
∗ = s −  ∑ Band δ> −  ∑ Fam"γ"? − 	#
$%"&'$(&' )@   and A7∗ is the standard deviation 
of ∗.12  We interpret  as the difference in individual ’s salary from the average salary 
of her closely substitutable coworkers and we will refer to  in what follows as ‘relative 
pay’. 
This relative pay variable is estimated from a first stage equation; thus, it is 
subject to sampling variation and its inclusion in the SRI enrollment equation may bias 
conventional standard errors.  Standard errors that do not account for this variation will 
be smaller than corrected standard errors if the disturbances are uncorrelated; however, if 
disturbances are correlated the direction is unknown.  To show the impact on our 
standard errors from a bias correction for this variation in the relative pay variable we 
also compute standard errors that use the method proposed by Murphy & Topel (2002). 
Another statistical issue that we face is the possibility of within employment unit 
correlation of disturbances.  Because we do not observe phenomenon such as 
management style, work environment, peer effects, or promotion structure, it is possible 
that employees within units are affected in similar ways by these unobservables.  
Uncorrected, standard errors could be smaller leading us to make incorrect claims about 
                                                 
11
 Results are not dependent on this specification.  Changing the aggregation cut-points, including age, age 
and age squared result in virtually no change in the second stage coefficient estimates. 
12
 The standard deviation on the residual is 0.17. 
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the significance of effects.  A common correction for this is to use the method of Liang & 
Zeger (1986) which nonparametrically adjusts the covariance matrix to account for 
clustering as well as heteroskedasticity.  The problem with applying this method to our 
research study is that it relies on group asymptotics and we have a meager 13 
employment units.  With a random effects framework, parametric adjustments and 
Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) similarly are infeasible with such a small 
number of groups; however, a corrected GEE  covariance matrix by the method of Bias 
Reduced Linearization (BRL) developed by Bell & McCaffrey (2002) is a possible 
solution for problems related to the small number of groups.  Bell & McCaffrey show, 
with Monte Carlo methods, that BRL seems to generate statistical tests of the correct size 
when applied to random effects models with normally distributed errors (Angrist & Lavy, 
2009) even when the group size is small. 
In practice, we find that the corrections we make for these statistical challenges 
with either the method of Murphy & Topel or Bell & McCaffrey lead to little adjustments 
on inference from robust standard errors.  However, we do not simultaneously correct for 
both concerns and it could be argued that the bias from each statistical issue would, if 
combined, equal more than the sum of the differences we observe individually.  
C Results 
C.1 Adverse selection 
 
Employers relying on a labor force reduction tool that shifts the discretion of exit 
to the employee need to be confident that the “right” employees choose to enroll.  The 
risk is that highly productive employees would be more likely to opt into the SRI since 
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the probability of obtaining a position elsewhere could be a less risky and a more 
lucrative prospect for these individuals.  If the employer loses highly productive 
employees they may also have lost substantial investments in human capital that it has 
made. 
To evaluate if the “right” type of employees enrolled in the SRI, we proceed in 
two steps.  First, we investigate whether a low value of our relative pay variable, the 
proxy for productivity, is associated with being laid off.  Specifically, did the university, 
when it used the discretionary tool of a layoff choose to terminate employees with low 
relative pay? Second, we test for whether low relative pay is associated with the decision 
to enroll in the SRI.   
To accomplish the first step we generate a new relative pay variable constructed 
from a combination of our SRI non-union eligible population with the population of 177 
non-union individuals that suffered layoffs from January, 2005 to March, 2009.  Layoffs 
for this population are for reasons defined as “lack of funds”, “lack of work”, or 
“reorganization”.  If low relative pay does indicate the “right” type of employee to enroll 
in the SRI we would expect that the employees laid off in these prior years were of lower 
relative pay. 
To calculate the relative pay variable on the combination of these two populations 
a few adjustments are necessary.  First, we convert the last annual equivalent salary 
received by the laid off population into a 2009 equivalent using the between year salary 
growth rate from our SRI population.  Further, two variables, the statutory/endowed 
indicator (which we use to distinguish certain pay band differences within the AS and AP 
units) and the years since job entry date, are not available for our layoff population.  Then, 
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to construct this new relative pay variable, BCD , we exclude those variables from the 
regression.  We are confident that this does not materially impact a comparison between 
the new relative pay variable and the relative pay variable calculated exclusively on the 
SRI non-union eligible population.  The correlation coefficient between p$EF and  
conditional on our SRI non-union eligible population is 0.978.   
In Figure 3 we show kernel density plots of p$EF for the SRI enrollment 
population and the layoff population using the epanechnikov kernel with a bandwidth of 
0.17.13  The density for the layoff population is shifted to the left with a mean of -0.22 
while the SRI population is centered at 0.04.  These means are significantly different with 
a t-statistic of 3.16.  There is observably much variation in the relative pay variable 
among the layoff population. 
A possible explanation for this variation is that wide differences existed in how 
binding the sets of feasible employees under consideration for a layoff were for layoffs 
that occurred from 2005 to 2009.  Although the university has discretion in choosing 
whom to layoff among workers not covered by a collective bargaining agreement, in 
effect it may be limited to selecting individuals from a pool attached to a particular 
project or program.  We would anticipate that a reorganization would impose the lowest 
constraint on its behavior, while it is unclear whether a lack of funds for a position or a 
lack of work for an employee or group would be more binding on its actions.  If funds are 
truly fungible a “lack of funds” might actually indicate an unwillingness of the university 
to make an allocation, perhaps because the set is not actually binding.  Alternatively, a 
                                                 
13
 The bandwidth chosen is the minimum of the optimal bandwidths of each density computed as the 
bandwidth that would minimize the mean integrated squared error if the data were distributed Gaussian 
and a Gaussian kernel were used (default Stata method). 
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“lack of work” could imply an unwillingness of the university to reposition a valued 
employee, again indicating a non-binding constraint.      
A further test then for the validity of the relative pay variable in serving as a 
proxy for productivity is to see how consistent it is with our expectations about how 
constrained each of the sets is above.  It seems reasonable to assume that when using a 
layoff the university would want to minimize the average of the productivity lost.  If we 
order the three groups of layoffs by the mean of the relative pay of the individuals laid off 
in each group, we have [Reorganization (-0.31), Lack of Funds (-0.16), Lack of Work (-
0.04)] from low to high. This roughly indicates that the reorganization feasible set is the 
least binding, consistent with our expectation, and the lack of work set is the most 
binding on university behavior.   
We will now evaluate how SRI enrollment is associated with the characteristic of 
low relative pay.  Using our relative pay variable calculated only on the set of SRI non-
union eligible individuals, we estimate linear probability and logit models of SRI 
enrollment on relative pay and subsets of the variables previously included in Appendix 
Table 1. The coefficients of the relative pay variable from each of the models are found 
in Table 2. 
  The coefficient on relative pay is stable across specifications, ranging from -0.032 
to -0.034 with little difference between the OLS and logit marginal effects.  Standard 
error adjustments do not change the conclusions drawn.  Our model suggests that a one 
standard deviation decrease in relative pay is associated with a 3.22% increase in the 
probability of enrolling in the SRI.14 
                                                 
14
 A final test for interpreting our relative pay variable as a proxy for productivity was to estimate its effect 
on eligible employees’ decisions to accept the retirement incentive offer in a sample of eligible employees 
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C.2 Job related risk factors 
 
We suspect that employees consider a distribution of possible future employment 
durations at the university when deciding whether to enroll in the SRI. Their perceptions 
of being involuntarily terminated from the university in the future surely influences their 
decision whether to accept the incentive offer. In the remainder of our paper we include 
variables that may be indicators of future job-loss risk into the equations that predict 
whether an individual will enroll in the SRI. Our research design makes use of the 
variation in layoffs, budgeted resources, and budgeted salary expenditures across 
employment units at the university from FY 2006 up until the SRI enrollment date of 
March 31, 2009.  Each measure is deflated by the beginning of fiscal year employee 
count to convert raw layoff and budget change numbers to a per employee number; we 
believe that these measures will be the ones that employees will focus on when 
contemplating their likelihood of future layoff.  
Of the indicators, layoffs are likely to be the most salient – a coworker’s 
disappearance would be more troubling and apparent than a change in resources or 
budgeted salary expenditure.  However, layoffs occur very infrequently in the data, 
approximately 200 between the start of FY 2005 and March 2009.  The between unit 
standard deviation is only 5 per 1,000 employees.   In contrast, the variation in per 
                                                                                                                                                 
who were covered by collective bargaining agreements. Inasmuch as these agreements do not provide for 
merit pay increases, we might expect that the coefficient of the relative pay variable would be statistically 
insignificantly different from zero when we estimate the relationship between SRI enrollment and relative 
pay for this sample (if the relationship in the nonunion sample is due to relatively low productive non 
union employees enrolling in the SRI). While the coefficient for the collective bargaining sample was 
statistically insignificantly different from zero at the .05 level of significance, it was negative and its 
absolute magnitude was larger than the similar coefficient from the sample of nonunion employees 
reported in the text. The magnitude of this coefficient in the collective bargaining sample reduces our 
confidence somewhat that our relative pay variable is a good proxy for relative productivity in the non 
collective bargaining sample. 
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employee budgeted resources and salary expenditure is more substantial with a between 
unit standard deviation of $100,000 for per employee resources and half that for per 
employee salary expenditures.  Of more importance to us, the difference in 2009 and 
2008 per employee resources has a standard deviation of $15,000 among employment 
units while the standard deviation of the difference for salary per employee over the same 
period is $4,000.   
However, there are some drawbacks to using per employee budgeted resource or 
salary expenditures changes.  A reduction in resources could indicate a reduction in 
facility expense or available supplies, or a failure to replace computers or peripherals and 
not actually suggest any immediate job loss risk to the employee.  In this scenario, it 
might be that any effect we observe is motivated by a reduction in the quality of the 
employee’s work environment and not from job loss related risk as we hypothesize.  Our 
salary expenditure measure reflects the apportioned amount of resources available per 
employee and if it proves statistically significant, its effect is more likely to be directly 
due to job loss concerns  
The layoff indicators we use are averages of layoffs per 1,000 employees by 
employment unit across a number of years.  Similarly our budgeted resources and salary 
expenditure measures are changes in per employee amounts in units of $10,000 per 
employee by employment unit.  The unconditional relationship between SRI enrollment 
probabilities and various indicators of job-loss risk are shown in Figure 4.  In the top left 
panel we graph unit SRI enrollment probabilities against the 2006 to 2009 unit layoffs per 
1,000 employees.  The correlation is clearly positive. Because the observation for the 
School of Industrial and Labor Relations (ILR) appears to be an outlier, when we conduct 
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multivariate analyses that include the layoff risk variables below, we will experiment 
with omitting ILR employees from our analyses to see if this omission materially alters 
any of our conclusions.  Our results suggest their omission does not make a difference. 
In the right panels we again graph unit SRI enrollment probabilities, but now with 
either 2009 minus 2008 budgeted resources per employee in $10,000 increments (top) or 
2009 minus 2008 budgeted salary expenditures per employee in $10,000 increments 
(bottom).  The correlation of each of these variables across units with the probability that 
the unit’s non-union eligible employees enrolled in the SRI is negative; this suggests that 
reductions or smaller increases in available per employee resources are associated with 
SRI enrollment.  These raw correlations do not account for the distribution of any of the 
individual level covariates that also are associated with SRI enrollment. So in the 
following sections we will estimate the effect of these unit resource variables holding 
constant the individual level variables, including relative pay. 
C.2.i Layoffs as indicators 
 
In Table 3 we report linear probability model coefficient estimates and logit 
model marginal effects for our relative pay and layoff variables.  The models reported in 
Panel A use unit layoffs per 1,000 employees averaged across the years 2006 to 2009. 
The models reported in Panels B and C are similar except that they use 3 and 2 year 
averages, respectively, for the layoff variables.  Column (1) shows the coefficient 
estimates for relative pay and our various layoff measures, when we control for 
employees’ age, years of service, full-time/part-time status and academic/nonacademic 
position status.  Columns (2) through (5) add additional explanatory variables to the 
models to see how sensitive our relative pay and layoff variables are to their inclusion. 
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Looking first at the relative pay coefficients, their magnitudes are not significantly 
different across specification and not significantly different from the estimates reported in 
Table 2 from models that exclude the layoff probability variables.  Similarly, the 
coefficients on the layoff variables show little change across specification within each 
panel.  Finally, the effect size on each layoff variable construction differs little depending 
on which average we choose.  Using the layoff variable constructed from a four year 
average subject to the largest number of covariates, (Column (5)), the coefficient of 
0.0181 implies that an increase of 5 layoffs per 1,000 employees is associated with a 9 
percentage point increase in the probability of enrolling in the SRI.  This suggests that 
employees were responding to perceptions of job-loss risk when deciding to accept the 
SRI. 
C.2.ii Resource deviations as indicators 
 
We estimated similar models to those shown in Table 3 with deviations in 
resources in place of layoffs as potential measures of job-loss risk and the results are 
presented in Table 4. Panel A includes a variable constructed as the 2009 total budgeted 
resources per employee less the 2008 total budgeted resources per employee in units of 
$10,000.  Panels B and C contain similar resource measure, with the deviations of the 
2009 amounts from two and three year previous averages, respectively.  The effect size 
diminishes from -0.022 for a one year deviation to approximately -0.008 for a deviation 
from a three year average, only significant at the 5% level for the one year deviation.  
This drop in effect size may reflect the limited time horizon employees consider when 
focusing on previous resource levels.  Interpreting the coefficient on the one year 
deviation in resources reported in Column (5), a one standard deviation unit increase in 
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resources of $15,000/employee is associated with a 3.3 percentage point decrease in the 
probability of enrolling in the SRI.  The one year budgeted resource deviation provides 
more support that employees were responding to perceptions of job loss risk. 
C.2.iii Budgeted salary expenditure deviations as a risk measure 
 
Our final measure of job-loss risk is reported in Table 5.  Here we include three 
panels as in Table 4 with Panel A reporting results based on regressions that include 2009 
per employee budgeted salary expenditures less 2008 per employee budgeted salary 
expenditures and the remaining panels report regressions that have a deviation from  two 
or three previous year averages.  Similar to the resource measures, the coefficient on the 
salary measure is consistently significant across specification only in the first panel.  
Because the movements and levels of the budgeted resources and budgeted salary 
measures per employee are highly correlated (Figure 1) we might expect each measure to 
essentially produce the same impact on employee acceptance of the incentive.  Results 
from Panel A suggest that an increase in budgeted per employee salary expenditures of 
one standard deviation ($4,000/employee) is associated with a decrease in the probability 
of enrolling in the SRI ranging from 3.3 to 3.8 percentage points - almost identical to the 
impact we reported above of a one standard deviation increase in the resource variable.  
The one year budgeted salary expenditure deviation provides further support that 
employees responded to perceptions of job loss risk. 
  
 
 
24
C.2.iv Do individuals of lower relative pay respond differently to job-loss risk and 
Does excluding individuals from the School of Industrial and Labor Relations 
Matter? 
 
We have found that, on average, individuals with lower relative pay were more 
likely to accept the offer of the retirement incentive. A subsidiary issue is whether these 
lower relative pay individuals are more sensitive to the possibility of future layoff and 
thus more likely to weight such a possibility more heavily in their acceptance decision. 
Panel A of Table 6  presents estimated coefficients from models that test if this occurs; 
we estimate models in which we restrict the sample first to people with relative pay 
above the mean and then with relative pay below the mean.  Recalling that the layoff and 
SRI acceptance rates for ILR were both much higher than for the rest of the university, 
we further restrict the sample in Panel B, exclude employees from ILR, to see if 
excluding the relatively small number of employees from this unit influences our 
estimated coefficients.  
Effect sizes between Panels A and B are very similar suggesting that our 
estimated relationships were not driven by the one “outlier” unit.  Moreover, we are not 
able to reject the hypothesis that employees whose relative pay variable is below or above 
average react differently to layoff probabilities or other measures of unit financial stress 
in making their decisions whether to accept the retirement incentive offer.    
C.2.v Does one indicator dominate? 
 
Finally, in Table 7 we simultaneously include our layoff risk indicator with the 
resource variable in Column 4, and with the salary variable in Column 5, to better assess 
which effect is more important in employees’ decisions whether to accept the retirement 
incentive.  The effects of these variables when they were included in the model one at a 
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time are shown in Columns 1 through 3 for comparative purposes.  The coefficient on the 
layoff variable changes very little when either the salary or resource variable is also 
included in the model.  In contrast, the salary and resource coefficients are approximately 
cut in half when the layoff variable is included in the model and their statistical 
significance is greatly reduced.  These findings suggest that the disappearance of co-
workers through layoffs is more relevant in a decision to accept early retirement than 
strictly financial indicators like resource or salary changes.  
D Conclusion 
 
The Cornell Staff Retirement Incentive (SRI) program helped the university to 
moderate the number of its employees that it subsequently laid off as it tried to restore its 
economic balance after the economic dislocation of 2008.  We have provided evidence 
that employees’ decisions to accept the incentive were conditioned on their perceptions of 
the economic stress that their units faced.  In addition, to the extent that our relative pay 
variable is a proxy for employees’ relative productivity, our results also suggest that 
adverse selection was not a problem for the university; on average it was the lower 
relative pay employees who accepted the retirement incentive offer.15   
  
                                                 
15
 However, we caution that the analyses we describe in footnote 14 when we analyzed the enrollment of 
employees covered by collective bargaining agreements in the SRI reduces our confidence somewhat that 
our relative pay variable is a good proxy for employees’ relative  productivity 
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 F Tables and figures 
 
Figure 1: Depiction of the variation in budgeted per employee resource and salary levels among units: Per employee 
budgeted resource and salary levels are averaged from 2005 to 2008 in $10,000 units graphed against employment units 
with two standard error bands shown in grey 
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Figure 2: Coefficients on age, years of service, and employment unit dummies from a regression of enrollment in SRI 
(Yes = 1) on age, years of service, employment unit and other covariates with two standard error bands.  Age is in 
comparison to those aged 55-56, years of service to 10-15, and employment unit to AS. 
Employment unit codes are as follows: SS “Student Services”, AP “Academic Programs”, AS “Administration 
and Support”, CALS “College of Agriculture and Life Sciences”, AAP “Architecture, Art & Planning”, ART 
“Arts and Sciences”, ENG “Engineering”, HOTEL “Hotel Administration”, CHE “College of Human Ecology”, 
ILR “Industrial and Labor Relations”, JS “Johnson School”, LAW “Law School”, VET “College of Veterinary 
Medicine”. 
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Figure 3: Kernel density plots of the relative pay variable calculated on the layoff and SRI non-union eligible combined 
population shown for each population separately
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Figure 4: Unconditional relationship between SRI enrollment (Yes = 1) and unit layoffs, per employee salary and resource levels.  
Dot sizes are in proportion to the size of the non-union eligible population employed in that unit.  
Employment unit codes are as follows: SS “Student Services”, AP “Academic Programs”, AS “Administration and 
Support”, CALS “College of Agriculture and Life Sciences”, AAP “Architecture, Art & Planning”, ART “Arts and 
Sciences”, ENG “Engineering”, HOTEL “Hotel Administration”, CHE “College of Human Ecology”, ILR “Industrial 
and Labor Relations”, JS “Johnson School”, LAW “Law School”, VET “College of Veterinary Medicine”. 
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 Table 1:  Mean comparisons for key explanatory variables 
 
  Enrolled +           
Variable Declined Enrolled Declined Difference T-stat   
       
Panel A: Socioeconomic       
Age 60.071 61.544 59.352 2.192 8.92 *** 
Yrs of Service 24.437 25.958 23.694 2.264 4.32 *** 
Fulltime 0.893 0.881 0.899 -0.018 -0.9  
Non-academic staff 0.828 0.855 0.814 0.041 1.67  
Female 0.625 0.645 0.616 0.029 0.92  
Asian 0.02 0.009 0.025 -0.016 -1.83  
Black 0.021 0.02 0.021 -0.001 -0.1  
Hispanic 0.011 0.009 0.012 -0.003 -0.58  
Unknown 0.007 0.014 0.003 0.011 2.19 * 
White 0.942 0.949 0.939 0.01 0.65  
Defined benefit plan 0.16 0.188 0.147 0.041 1.7  
Spouse or partner on health plan 0.445 0.435 0.451 -0.016 -0.5  
Dependent child on health plan 0.235 0.176 0.264 -0.088 -3.18 ** 
Salary 2006 to 2009 rel change 0.148 0.13 0.156 -0.026 -3.12 ** 
Log 2009 salary 11.022 10.978 11.044 -0.066 -2.29 * 
       
Panel B: Employment units       
Student Services (SS) 0.086 0.068 0.094 -0.026 -1.44  
Academic Programs (AP) 0.154 0.131 0.165 -0.034 -1.47  
Administration and Support (AS) 0.291 0.321 0.276 0.045 1.52  
College of Agriculture and Life 
Sciences (CALS) 
      
0.163 0.168 0.161 0.007 0.28  
Architecture, Art, & Planning 
(AAP) 0.011 0.014 0.01 0.004 0.66  
Arts and Sciences (ART) 0.096 0.077 0.105 -0.028 -1.5  
Engineering (ENG) 0.029 0.026 0.031 -0.005 -0.45  
Hotel Administration (HOTEL) 0.012 0.009 0.014 -0.005 -0.75  
College of Human Ecology (CHE) 0.029 0.037 0.025 0.012 1.1  
Industrial and Labor Relations 
(ILR) 0.038 0.063 0.026 0.037 2.91 ** 
Johnson School (JS) 0.016 0.026 0.011 0.015 1.78  
Law School (LAW) 0.019 0.011 0.022 -0.011 -1.23  
College of Veterinary Medicine 
(VET) 0.057 0.051 0.06 -0.009 -0.56   
 Table 2:  Coefficients on the relative pay variable from regressions of SRI enrollment (Yes = 1) on relative pay and hierarchical compositions of covariates 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  OLS Logit   OLS Logit   OLS Logit   OLS Logit   OLS Logit 
Relative -0.0332 -0.0331  -0.0336 -0.0336  -0.0339 -0.0343  -0.0337 -0.0341  -0.0322 -0.0296 
pay (0.0136)* (0.0138)*  (0.0136)* (0.0138)*  (0.0136)* (0.0138)*  (0.0137)* (0.0139)*  (0.0138)* (0.0137)* 
 [0.0136]*   [0.0136]*   [0.0136]*   [0.0136]*   [0.0134]*  
 {0.0134}*   {0.0137}*   {0.0135}*   {0.0140}*     
               
Covariates included in the models above:             
               
Age, yrs of service,  fulltime 
and academic staff dummies YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
               
Gender and ethnicity    YES  YES  YES  YES 
               
Defined benefit       YES  YES  YES 
               
Family characteristics          YES  YES 
               
Unit dummies and salary change                       YES 
               
Sample size is 1073.  P-values indicated by: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001.  Robust standard errors shown in parenthesis for OLS with OIM for logit.  
Standard errors calculated via Murphy & Topel (1985) shown in brackets.   
Standard errors calculated using the method of biased reduced linearization proposed by Bell & McCaffrey (2002) shown in curly braces clustering on unit dummies. 
 
 Table 3: Layoff and relative pay coefficients from regressions of SRI enrollment (Yes = 1) on hierarchical compositions of covariates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit 
           
Panel A: 4 year average          
           
Relative pay -0.0334 -0.0329 -0.0336 -0.0333 -0.0338 -0.0335 -0.0334 -0.0331 -0.0329 -0.0298 
 (0.0136)* (0.0136)* (0.0136)* (0.0136)* (0.0136)* (0.0136)* (0.0137)* (0.0137)* (0.0136)* (0.0139)* 
           
Per unit layoffs  
2009-2006 average 
0.0199 0.0191 0.0194 0.0186 0.0187 0.0178 0.0188 0.0179 0.0189 0.0181 
(0.0045)*** (0.0042)*** (0.0046)*** (0.0042)*** (0.0048)*** (0.0043)*** (0.0048)*** (0.0043)*** (0.0048)*** (0.0043)*** 
                      
Panel B: 3 year average          
           
Relative pay -0.0334 -0.0327 -0.0337 -0.0331 -0.0338 -0.0334 -0.0335 -0.0330 -0.0330 -0.0296 
 (0.0136)* (0.0136)* (0.0136)* (0.0136)* (0.0136)* (0.0136)* (0.0137)* (0.0137)* (0.0136)* (0.0139)* 
           
Per unit layoffs  
2009-2007 average 
0.0148 0.0140 0.0145 0.0137 0.0139 0.0131 0.0139 0.0131 0.0140 0.0132 
(0.0035)*** (0.0032)*** (0.0035)*** (0.0032)*** (0.0036)*** (0.0032)*** (0.0036)*** (0.0032)*** (0.0036)*** (0.0032)*** 
                      
Panel C: 2 year average          
           
Relative pay -0.0335 -0.0331 -0.0336 -0.0334 -0.0338 -0.0337 -0.0334 -0.0334 -0.0330 -0.0302 
 (0.0136)* (0.0136)* (0.0136)* (0.0136)* (0.0136)* (0.0136)* (0.0137)* (0.0137)* (0.0136)* (0.0139)* 
           
Per unit layoffs  
2009-2008 average 
0.0145 0.0140 0.0140 0.0135 0.0133 0.0128 0.0134 0.0129 0.0134 0.0129 
(0.0036)*** (0.0033)*** (0.0036)*** (0.0033)*** (0.0037)*** (0.0033)*** (0.0037)*** (0.0033)*** (0.0037)*** (0.0033)*** 
           
           
Covariates included in the models above:         
           
Basica YES YES YES YES YES 
           
Gender and ethnicity  YES YES YES YES 
           
Defined benefit    YES YES YES 
           
Family characteristics      YES YES 
           
Salary change               YES 
aBasic covariates include age, yrs of service,  fulltime and academic staff dummies.  P-values indicated by: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001.   
Sample size is 1073.  Robust standard errors shown in parenthesis for OLS with observed information matrix for logit.  
 Table 4: Resource and relative pay coefficients from regressions of SRI enrollment (Yes = 1) on hierarchical compositions of covariates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit 
           
Panel A: Deviation from prior year          
           
Relative pay -0.0333 -0.0335 -0.0334 -0.0339 -0.0337 -0.0345 -0.0335 -0.0343 -0.0330 -0.0317 
 (0.0136)* (0.0137)* (0.0136)* (0.0137)* (0.0136)* (0.0137)* (0.0137)* (0.0138)* (0.0136)* (0.0140)* 
           
 Res 2009 per emp dev 
from prior year 
-0.0233 -0.0242 -0.0219 -0.0224 -0.0216 -0.0223 -0.0216 -0.0222 -0.0212 -0.0217 
(0.0106)* (0.0109)* (0.0106)* (0.0110)* (0.0106)* (0.0110)* (0.0106)* (0.0110)* (0.0106)* (0.0110)* 
                      
Panel B: Deviation from 2 year avg          
           
Relative pay -0.0332 -0.0333 -0.0334 -0.0338 -0.0337 -0.0345 -0.0335 -0.0343 -0.0331 -0.0315 
 (0.0136)* (0.0137)* (0.0136)* (0.0138)* (0.0136)* (0.0138)* (0.0137)* (0.0138)* (0.0136)* (0.0141)* 
           
 Res 2009 per emp dev 
from 2 year  avg 
-0.0190 -0.0195 -0.0180 -0.0181 -0.0198 -0.0202 -0.0197 -0.0201 -0.0194 -0.0199 
(0.0130) (0.0126) (0.0130) (0.0127) (0.0130) (0.0127) (0.0131) (0.0127) (0.0130) (0.0127) 
                      
Panel C: Deviation from 3 year avg          
           
Relative pay -0.0332 -0.0332 -0.0335 -0.0337 -0.0338 -0.0344 -0.0336 -0.0342 -0.0332 -0.0314 
 (0.0136)* (0.0138)* (0.0136)* (0.0138)* (0.0136)* (0.0138)* (0.0137)* (0.0139)* (0.0136)* (0.0141)* 
           
 Res 2009 per emp dev 
from 3 year  avg 
-0.0068 -0.0071 -0.0055 -0.0057 -0.0088 -0.0092 -0.0087 -0.0091 -0.0081 -0.0083 
(0.0109) (0.0106) (0.0110) (0.0106) (0.0111) (0.0108) (0.0111) (0.0108) (0.0111) (0.0108) 
           
           
Covariates included in the models above:         
           
Basica YES YES YES YES YES 
           
Gender and ethnicity  YES YES YES YES 
           
Defined benefit    YES YES YES 
           
Family characteristics      YES YES 
           
Salary change               YES 
aBasic covariates include age, yrs of service,  fulltime and academic staff dummies.  P-values indicated by: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001.   
Sample size is 1073.  Robust standard errors shown in parenthesis for OLS with observed information matrix for logit.  
 Table 5: Salary expenditures and relative pay coefficients from regressions of SRI enrollment (Yes = 1) on hierarchical compositions of covariates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit 
           
Panel A: Deviation from prior year          
           
Relative pay -0.0333 -0.0336 -0.0334 -0.0339 -0.0337 -0.0344 -0.0334 -0.0341 -0.0329 -0.0317 
 (0.0136)* (0.0136)* (0.0136)* (0.0137)* (0.0136)* (0.0137)* (0.0137)* (0.0137)* (0.0136)* (0.0139)* 
           
 Sal 2009 per emp dev from 
prior year 
-0.0918 -0.0950 -0.0881 -0.0901 -0.0834 -0.0859 -0.0837 -0.0860 -0.0830 -0.0846 
(0.0311)** (0.0326)** (0.0308)** (0.0327)** (0.0311)** (0.0329)** (0.0312)** (0.0329)** (0.0311)** (0.0330)* 
                      
Panel B: Deviation from 2 year avg          
           
Relative pay -0.0333 -0.0335 -0.0334 -0.0339 -0.0337 -0.0345 -0.0334 -0.0343 -0.0330 -0.0317 
 (0.0136)* (0.0137)* (0.0136)* (0.0137)* (0.0136)* (0.0137)* (0.0137)* (0.0138)* (0.0136)* (0.0140)* 
           
 Sal 2009 per emp dev from 
2 year  avg 
-0.0778 -0.0792 -0.0737 -0.0745 -0.0702 -0.0716 -0.0703 -0.0715 -0.0706 -0.0709 
(0.0364)* (0.0366)* (0.0362)* (0.0367)* (0.0364) (0.0369) (0.0365) (0.0369) (0.0363) (0.0369) 
                      
Panel C: Deviation from 3 year avg          
           
Relative pay -0.0332 -0.0332 -0.0335 -0.0337 -0.0338 -0.0344 -0.0336 -0.0342 -0.0332 -0.0314 
 (0.0136)* (0.0138)* (0.0136)* (0.0138)* (0.0136)* (0.0138)* (0.0137)* (0.0138)* (0.0136)* (0.0141)* 
           
 Sal 2009 per emp dev from 
3 year  avg 
-0.0388 -0.0395 -0.0331 -0.0341 -0.0368 -0.0383 -0.0365 -0.0378 -0.0357 -0.0359 
(0.0384) (0.0371) (0.0385) (0.0372) (0.0386) (0.0375) (0.0388) (0.0375) (0.0386) (0.0374) 
           
           
Covariates included in the models above:         
           
Basica YES YES YES YES YES 
           
Gender and ethnicity  YES YES YES YES 
           
Defined benefit    YES YES YES 
           
Family characteristics      YES YES 
           
Salary change               YES 
aBasic covariates include age, yrs of service,  fulltime and academic staff dummies.  P-values indicated by: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001.   
Sample size is 1073.  Robust standard errors shown in parenthesis for OLS with observed information matrix for logit.  
  
Table 6: Regression of SRI (Yes = 1) on models with layoff, resource and salary change by relative pay 
  Relative pay >= 0             
  + Relative pay < 0   Relative pay >= 0   Relative pay < 0 
 OLS Logit  OLS Logit  OLS Logit 
Panel A: Everyone         
         
Dependent variable mean 0.3281  0.2832  0.3700 
         
A.1: Models with layoff         
         
Layoff per emp 2006-2009 
avg 
0.0190 0.0183  0.0108 0.0111  0.0232 0.0222 
(0.0049)*** (0.0043)*** (0.0068) (0.0069)  (0.0067)*** (0.0059)*** 
         
A.2: Models with resources         
         
Resource 2009 per emp 
deviation from 2008 
-0.0214 -0.0211  -0.0060 -0.0064  -0.0360 -0.0353 
(0.0106)* (0.011)  (0.0147) (0.0153)  (0.0151)* (0.0156)* 
         
A.3: Models with salary         
         
Salary 2009 per emp 
deviation from 2008 
-0.0838 -0.0828  -0.0560 -0.0590  -0.1032 -0.0996 
(0.031)** (0.033)*  (0.0435) (0.0462)  (0.0452)* (0.0468)* 
         
Sample size 1073   519   554 
         
Panel B: Without ILR employees        
         
Dependent variable mean 0.3198  0.2809  0.3566 
         
B.1: Models with layoff         
         
Layoff per emp 2006-2009 
avg 
0.0196 0.0193  0.0211 0.0209  0.0156 0.0158 
(0.0089)* (0.0088)*  (0.0121) (0.0125)  (0.0132) (0.0125) 
         
B.2: Models with resources         
         
Resource 2009 per emp 
deviation from 2008 
-0.0223 -0.0218  -0.0068 -0.0073  -0.0375 -0.0364 
(0.0106)* (0.0109)*  (0.0148) (0.0153)  (0.0151)* (0.0153)* 
         
B.3: Models with salary         
         
Salary 2009 per emp 
deviation from 2008 
-0.0785 -0.0763  -0.0584 -0.0611  -0.0942 -0.0887 
(0.0313)* (0.0328)*  (0.0443) (0.0464)  (0.0452)* (0.0461) 
         
Sample size 1032  502  530 
                  
Robust standard errors shown in parenthesis for OLS with observed information matrix for logit.   All models contain 
age, yrs of service, fulltime and academic staff dummies, gender and ethnicity, defined benefit, family characteristics, 
and salary change.   Not included are relative pay or unit dummies. 
 P-values indicated by: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001.  
  
Table 7: Regression of SRI (Yes = 1) on models with job loss indicators given individually and in combinationa 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5) 
          
Panel A: OLS models         
          
Relative pay -0.0329  -0.0330  -0.0329  -0.0328  -0.0328 
 (0.0136)*  (0.0136)*  (0.0136)*  (0.0136)*  (0.0136)* 
          
Layoff per emp 2006-2009 
avg 
0.0189      0.0178  0.0168 
(0.0048)***      (0.0049)*** (0.0051)*** 
          
Resource 2009 per emp 
deviation from 2008 
  -0.0212    -0.0125   
  (0.0106)*    (0.0109)   
          
Salary 2009 per emp 
deviation from 2008 
    -0.0830    -0.0465 
    (0.0311)**   (0.0329) 
                    
          
Panel B: Logit models         
          
Relative pay -0.0298  -0.0317  -0.0317  -0.0303  -0.0304 
 (0.0139)*  (0.0140)*  (0.0139)*  (0.0139)*  (0.0139)* 
          
Layoff per emp 2006-2009 
avg 
0.0181      0.0170  0.0160 
(0.0043)***      (0.0044)*** (0.0046)*** 
          
Resource 2009 per emp 
deviation from 2008 
  -0.0217    -0.0130   
  (0.0110)*    (0.0112)   
          
Salary 2009 per emp 
deviation from 2008 
    -0.0846    -0.0485 
    (0.0330)*    (0.0343) 
                    
a The correlation between the salary and resource indicators is high (0.90).  Consequently, they are not 
included in the same regression. 
Robust standard errors shown in parenthesis for OLS with observed information matrix for logit.   All models 
contain age, yrs of service, fulltime and academic staff dummies, gender and ethnicity, defined benefit, family 
characteristics, and salary change.   Not included are unit dummies. 
 P-values indicated by: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001.  
 Appendix Table 1: Regression of enrolled in SRI (Yes = 1) on socioeconomic characteristics and 
employment unit dummies 
  OLS   LOGIT 
Aged 57-58 -0.0199  -0.0277 
 (0.0375)  (0.0484) 
    
Aged 59-60 0.1271**  0.1324** 
 (0.0438)  (0.0457) 
    
Aged 61-62 0.2242*** 0.2156*** 
 (0.0466)  (0.0450) 
    
Aged 63-64 0.2939*** 0.2791*** 
 (0.0551)  (0.0512) 
    
Aged 65-66 0.3010*** 0.2832*** 
 (0.0664)  (0.0586) 
    
Aged 67-68 0.3321*** 0.3165*** 
 (0.0873)  (0.0780) 
    
Aged 69+ 0.3749*** 0.3453*** 
 (0.0955)  (0.0781) 
    
Yrs Srv 16-20 0.0167  0.0184 
 (0.0459)  (0.0470) 
    
Yrs Srv 21-25 0.0400  0.0409 
 (0.0421)  (0.0435) 
    
Yrs Srv 26-30 0.0580  0.0608 
 (0.0430)  (0.0434) 
    
Yrs Srv 31-35 0.1180*  0.1157* 
 (0.0515)  (0.0487) 
    
Yrs Srv 36+ 0.1829**  0.1615** 
 (0.0614)  (0.0537) 
    
Fulltime -0.0148  -0.0051 
 (0.0513)  (0.0472) 
    
Non-academic staff 0.0550  0.0604 
 (0.0404)  (0.0429) 
    
Female 0.0157  0.0196 
 (0.0304)  (0.0300) 
    
Asian -0.1804*  -0.2202 
 (0.0776)  (0.1248) 
     
Black 0.0233  0.0228 
 (0.0966)  (0.0943) 
    
Hispanic -0.0195  -0.0097 
 (0.1417)  (0.1356) 
    
Unknown 0.3602  0.3140 
 (0.2015)  (0.1620) 
    
Defined benefit plan -0.0096  -0.0068 
 (0.0507)  (0.0481) 
    
Spouse or partner on health plan 0.0031  0.0048 
 (0.0296)  (0.0288) 
    
Dependent child on health plan -0.0226  -0.0238 
 (0.0330)  (0.0370) 
    
SS -0.0995  -0.0970 
 (0.0534)  (0.0542) 
    
AP -0.1234**  -0.1191** 
 (0.0438)  (0.0453) 
    
CALS 0.0047  0.0063 
 (0.0496)  (0.0487) 
    
AAP 0.0923  0.0984 
 (0.1507)  (0.1249) 
    
ART -0.1478**  -0.1445** 
 (0.0532)  (0.0553) 
    
ENG -0.1346  -0.1319 
 (0.0826)  (0.0858) 
    
HOTEL -0.1162  -0.1133 
 (0.1029)  (0.1326) 
    
CHE 0.0124  0.0137 
 (0.0963)  (0.0822) 
    
ILR 0.2280**  0.2120** 
 (0.0850)  (0.0729) 
    
JS 0.1648  0.1445 
 (0.1165)  (0.1039) 
    
LAW -0.1055  -0.1043 
 (0.0982)  (0.1117) 
     
VET -0.0518  -0.0434 
 (0.0671)  (0.0681) 
    
Salary 2006 to 2009 rel change -0.2086*  -0.3144* 
 (0.1029)  (0.1517) 
    
Log 2009 salary -0.0934*  -0.0866* 
 (0.0376)  (0.0368) 
    
Constant 1.2053**   
 (0.4133)   
        
Sample size is 1073.  Robust standard errors shown in parenthesis for OLS with observed 
information matrix for logit. 
Employment unit codes are as follows: SS “Student Services”, AP “Academic Programs”, AS 
“Administration and Support”, CALS “College of Agriculture and Life Sciences”, AAP 
“Architecture, Art & Planning”, ART “Arts and Sciences”, ENG “Engineering”, HOTEL “Hotel 
Administration”, CHE “College of Human Ecology”, ILR “Industrial and Labor Relations”, JS 
“Johnson School”, LAW “Law School”, VET “College of Veterinary Medicine”. 
 
 
